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Introduction 
“How becoming!” we say (though often with a subtle ironic twist) when someone 
says or does something that we find is suitable or appropriate for him- or her or 
the situation in which he or she is. And while it may be old-fashioned, the phrase 
is also used when the clothes people are wearing make them look attractive. By 
pronouncing: ‘how becoming!’ we condone the appearance, the saying or the 
doing by making a reference to the appropriateness of somebody’s attire, words 
and deeds. However, the appropriateness is situated in that it is based on 
cultural conventions of a particular time and space, and simultaneously produces 
culturally accepted boundaries around what denotes culturally intelligible 
identities or subject positions (parallel to suggesting that something is “for the 
likes of you/us” versus ”not for the likes of you/us” (Bourdieu, 1990:55-56)).  
 
What I shall suggest in this paper is that in this sense our attire, what we say 
and what we do are related to the ways in which genders are performed, and to 
whether we are accepted as ‘culturally intelligible subjects’ or not (Butler, 1990). 
As such, the purpose of this paper is to explore the theoretical relations between 
‘how becoming!’ (i.e. the construction of boundaries of cultural intelligibility) and 
‘how becoming?’ (i.e. the process of becoming a subject). Prior to elaborating on 
how I shall explore (and hopefully, establish) this relation, however, I shall 
provide an explanation of the empirical phenomenon, which have spurred my 
curiosity, and hence how I wish to contribute to the field of ‘Gender and 
Organization’ by exploring the relation between boundaries of cultural 
intelligibility and the process of becoming.  
 
The Empirical phenomenon called ‘Sex Segregation’ 
For more than three decades, the concept of sex segregation has received wide 
attention within the field of “Gender and Organization” studies. Over the years, 
the phenomenon has been studied from a variety of feminist perspectives, 
applying different concepts of gender, different epistemologies and different 
methodologies. Important theoretical advances and contributions have been 
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made, but changes in the object of research – sex segregation in organizations – 
have only been minor and occurred gradually.  
 
On the one hand, researchers have pointed out that sex segregation is pervasive 
and persistent (Baron & Bielby, 1985), and that gendering remains a central and 
pivotal dimension of organizations. It has been documented that e.g. work and 
professions are gendered (Marshall, 1984; Collinson & Hearn, 1996), that 
organizational cultures are gendered (Mills & Tancred-Mills, 1992; Gherardi, 
1995; Martin, 1990), and that organizational structures are gendered (Kanter, 
1977; Ferguson, 1984; Wahl, 1992). On the other hand, and despite the intensive 
focus from the pool of researchers within the field and what appear to be endless 
efforts of change both at the societal and organizational level sex segregation 
persists both vertically and horizontally (Chafetz, 1989; Calás & Smircich, 1996). 
At the societal level, women still make out a smaller proportion of e.g. government 
officials and high court judges, while they dominate numerically in the group of 
those who receive social benefits (Danmarks Statistik, 2003). At the 
organizational level, sex segregation means that women as a group continue to 
occupy less prestigious jobs that pay less, include fewer promotion opportunities 
and have less job security while men as a group continue to dominate within the 
ranks of top-management (Alvesson & Billing, 1997).  
 
While the purpose of this study is not to conclude on how and by which means 
the situation could or should be changed, the empirical phenomenon and its 
persistency remains a central concern of the study. As such, my purpose is to 
propose a theoretical frame, which is able to further our understanding of the 
dynamics by which the segregation is reproduced.1 The current investigation can 
hence be viewed as an answer to the call of Yancey Martin (2003:361) to 
                                       
1 While the purpose of this paper is merely to develop a deeper, richer, or perhaps just different, 
understanding of the phenomenon of gender segregation and, most importantly, the mechanisms 
by which the phenomenon is reproduced, this understanding may also be viewed as the first and 
necessary step towards any change of the situation. 
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incorporate ‘the “saying and doing” of gender’ into organization theory and 
research.  
 
However, while Yancey Martin (2003) proposes that research aimed at 
understanding the mechanisms by which sex segregation is produced may be 
done by applying a two-sided dynamic – “gendering practices” and “practicing of 
gender” – this study focuses exclusively on the latter of the two. The choice of 
only one of the two-sided dynamic is based upon the fundamental assumption 
that studies of “practicing of gender” may be taken to be an empirical question 
(e.g. how is gender practiced/performed in a local, organizational context?), 
whereas any analysis of “gendering practices” involves an a priori judgment of 
what denotes “gender equality”, as well as “femininity” and “masculinity”, which 
in my perspective is reminiscent of conducting research by applying ‘the God-
trick of seeing everything from nowhere’, as Donna Haraway (1991:188) has so 
eloquently phrased it. Hence, the analytical starting point of this paper is to 
introduce the gender perspective applied in this study, which will be the point of 
departure for further discussions of how gender and the construction of subject 
positions are related to one another. In order to establish the analytical 
perspective of this study I shall begin by introducing the understanding of gender 
that lies at its base.  
 
Gender perspective: Sex as the main classificatory principle 
While ‘to classify is human’ (Bowker & Star, 2002:1), the classificatory principles 
applied (e.g. by which dichotomies or differences classifications are made) are 
negotiated socially, culturally, if not politically. In Bowker & Star’s perspective 
(2002:10), a classification is a spatial, temporal, or spatio-temporal segmentation 
of the world. A “classification system” is a set of boxes (metaphorical or literal) 
into which things can be put to do some kind of work – bureaucratic or 
knowledge production”. According to Bowker & Star (2002:10) classification 
systems exhibit the following properties: 
1. There are consistent, unique classificatory principles in operation. 
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2. The categories are mutually exclusive. 
3. The system is complete. 
 
While Bowker & Star (2002:11) claim that ‘no real-world classification system 
that we have looked at meets these “simple” requirements and we doubt that any 
ever could’, I will propose that the current classification system using sex as the 
primary classificatory principle may be the one that comes closest.2  
 
The case of Apartheid provides an illustrative example of the operation of and 
consequences created by a classificatory system in this respect. While the 
practice of Apartheid in South Africa has tormented the people of South Africa in 
more and more vicious ways than can possibly be imagined, these practices are 
illustrative of the ways in which classification systems work, and which 
consequences classifications are able to produce (Bowker & Star, 2002). 
 
In a convincing analysis of the system of Apartheid, Bowker & Star (2002:202) 
quote Saul Dubow on the scientific history of South African racial theories: 
‘The typological method is at the heart of physical anthropology. It was based on 
empiricist principles of classification taxonomy originally developed in the natural 
sciences. The conception of race as “type” encouraged a belief in the existence of ideal 
categories and stressed diversity and difference over similarity and convergence. This 
was overlaid by binary-based notions of superiority and inferiority, progress and 
degeneration. (…) The search for pure racial types could not easily be reconciled with 
the evident fact that, in practice, only hybrids existed’. 
 
My question in this regard is: At the present point, how is this different from the 
practices of gender? In another point in time and space, could this society’s 
current classificatory schemes be described thus:  
‘The typological method was at the heart of the understanding of gender. It was based 
on empiricist principles of classification taxonomy originally developed in the natural 
sciences. The conception of sex as “type” encouraged a belief in the existence of ideal 
                                       
2 In fact, the proposition of this study is that sex as a classificatory principle is the main 
classificatory principle by which we become subjects in this particular point in time and space.  
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categories and stressed diversity and difference over similarity and convergence. This 
was overlaid by binary-based notions of superiority and inferiority, progress and 
degeneration. (…) The search for pure sex types was seemingly unaffected by evident 
fact that, in practice, only hybrids existed’. 
 
While most of us (except for those on the far-right of the political arena) may not 
have any problems with accepting that the practice of Apartheid is discriminatory 
and essentializing, it may prove to be more challenging to accept a similar view of 
the current social practices of gender. However, I will argue that sex is the 
primary principle of classification to which we currently adhere.3 I base my 
argument upon, first, that sex is consistently applied as the unique classificatory 
principle in operation. Second, the categories of man/woman, male/female are 
perceived to be mutually exclusive, thereby rendering the subjects that do not “fit 
into” the established categories with an abject status (Butler, 1993). And third, 
while the system may not be complete to the extent that some might wish for, we 
collectively assume such completeness. Thereby we disregard any human beings 
who do not fall into one – and only one – category. Hence, these human beings 
come to perform the constitutive outside of the system. While there are certainly 
beings that do not fit readily into the system, it is indeed a prominent and 
enduring belief that the system is an “ideal classification system”, and that ‘it 
provides total coverage of the world it describes’ (Bowker & Star, 2002:11). This 
belief is perhaps the central element ensuring the legitimacy of the system.  
 
                                       
3 Yvonne Hirdman (2001) also uses (albeit implicitly) sex as the primary classificatory principle, 
when arguing that the man is the norm (the “A”) in contrast to the woman (as “a”, “B”, or “not A”). 
Hirdman, however, concentrates her efforts on discussing how the classificatory principle works 
rather than discussing how it became or that it is to be the main classificatory principle. 
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As such, the starting point of an analysis of the phenomenon of sex segregation 
from this perspective cannot be whether sex works as a discriminatory principle4. 
On the contrary, the analytical focus must be directed at how and with what 
other classificatory schemes this distinction is produced and reproduced. Thereby 
this analysis facilitates discussions of the consequences that classifications and 
social practices have for the possibilities of becoming a (socially intelligible) 
subject.  
 
Consequently, the focus of this study will be directed towards the mechanisms, 
which serve to continuously enforce or counter the classification based on sex, 
and consequently (re)produces the sex segregation. The main interest of the paper 
is thus to investigate the (situated) mechanisms involved in the process of 
creating subject positions, but from a perspective in which subjects are always 
already classified by their sex.5  
 
Sex segregation, Gender and Post-structuralism 
The point of departure of the study is that the mere persistence of the 
phenomenon of sex segregation indicates that the full scope of the dynamics by 
which this segregation is reproduced has not yet been realized. The aim of this 
study is hence to introduce an alternative lens through which to view the 
phenomenon in the hope that this may facilitate alternative views and 
conceptualizations of the phenomenon; approaches which shed further, or a 
                                       
4 A similar argument is made in Søndergaard (2000:35), where she argues: ‘(t)hat gendered 
expressions are non-reflexive does not mean that they [the expressions] thereby loose their effect – 
that is to say, their effects as an idea of the meaning of gender in the creation of the social order. 
The effect remains independent of whether the expressions are reflexive or not, with the individual 
who are the carrier of it [the gendered expression]. You cannot choose not to express something; 
you cannot choose not to be understood in relation to sex in cultures where sex is the general 
element of construction of the social order (…) The main argument is that nobody can leave the 
expressions undone; nobody can withdraw from the negotiations [of gender]’. [Own translation 
from Danish] 
5 This piece of research hence seeks to avoid judging whether the mechanisms are discriminating 
against women or men, and what denotes inherent features of “masculine” or “feminine” being. 
The aim of the study is to gain access to how gender is performed, and through/by which social 
practices and classifications this is done. 
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different kind of, light on the process thereby illuminating new, and perhaps 
critical, dimensions of the phenomenon.  
 
The purpose of this study is to further our understanding of how particular 
organizational practices serve to reproduce a particular gender order. The 
theoretical proposition is that by scrutinizing the ways in which human beings 
become subjects, and how that process is related to social practices and 
classificatory principles, we are able to further our understanding of the 
phenomenon of sex segregation. 
 
The ontological point of departure of the paper is that one of the basic social 
needs of human beings is to make sense, to be recognized; to be culturally 
intelligible and to belong. Furthermore, that the process by which we are able to 
be recognized or become a subject (i.e. to assume an identity) is continuously 
negotiated through social practices. Hence, the aim of the research is to develop 
an alternative frame of understanding, which is able to grasp how social practices 
in organizational settings are able to draw boundaries between and among 
subject positions, and thereby to challenge or to restore the gender segregation at 
the organizational level. Consequently, the concepts of social practices and 
classifications will be related to the ways in which we are able to become subjects 
in an organizational context.  
 
While sex segregation in itself may be an interesting phenomenon, my interest is 
primarily spurred by the fact that it has proven to be immensely resistant to 
political efforts of ensuring gender equality. Moreover, my interest in the 
phenomenon of sex segregation is also related to the social constructivist/post-
structural scientific position that is adopted in this study. In this scientific 
perspective, sex segregation becomes particularly interesting due to the 
fundamental belief that this segregation is “produced” rather than “natural”, i.e. 
that it is a social construction (with material and gendered consequences) rather 
than the result of natural dispositions or natural laws. The same line of argument 
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can be extended to account for the choice of gender perspective, which has 
informed the current study.  
 
As mentioned above, the point of departure of the gender perspective applied in 
this study is that classifications based on sex are themselves social 
constructions, which materializes in processes of subjectivation. In the context of 
this study, the concept of “sex” will be used to signify the ‘classificatory principle’ 
(Bowker & Star, 2002: 10) by which human beings are able to become (culturally 
intelligible) subjects. The proposition of the study is that sex as the main 
classificatory principle may have become so central to our understanding of the 
world, that we have difficulties with even accepting (and conceptualizing) that it is 
merely one, of a multitude of possible, classificatory principles by which the world 
of human beings could be classified. However, while sex plays a central role in 
the current constructions of our identities due to social and/or cultural practices, 
that does not mean that either sex or gender is necessarily the most essential or 
even necessary component of our identities.  
 
In my perspective, there is no such thing as an essential, pre-cultural “woman’s 
view”; gender is a doing rather than a being (Butler, 1990). There are no inherent 
feminine or masculine characteristics or values that are pre-cultural, but we 
perform our (gendered) identities through a ‘gendered matrix’ (Butler, 1990:7), 
which has been naturalized to such an extent that thinking about sex/gender 
simply as one of many possible classificatory schemes available becomes difficult, 
and acquires ‘work’. Sex is pivotal to the ways in which we reproduce particular 
boundaries of meaning and thus the room of intelligibility within which we can 
make ourselves socially intelligible subjects.  
 
What follows from the gender perspective applied in this study is also that gender 
is made to be the central distinction we apply when discriminating between 
human subjects at this particular point in time and space. While sex may signify 
the main classificatory principle, gender is a practice. Gender is how and what we 
become. Practicing gender is what we do when social practices applying 
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alternative classificatory principles are involved in the production of socially 
intelligible subjects. We perform gendered identities by acting in accordance with, 
first, the classificatory principle of sex, and second, with the locally negotiated 
social practices, which are based on locally negotiated classificatory schemes.  
 
Accepting/assuming that the classificatory principle of sex is pivotal to the 
process of becoming a subject calls for analyses of how other social practices and 
classificatory principles are related to “practices of gender”. Moreover, it becomes 
possible to investigate which subject positions that are naturalized and/or tacitly 
reproduced in a particular setting.6 
 
As a consequence, the mechanisms by which we become culturally intelligible 
subjects are conceptualized as building upon and relating to social practices, 
which have sex as the main classificatory principle. However, the ways in which 
this mechanism and the ways in which it work can be conceptualized, need to be 
developed further. This will consequently be the topic of the following section.  
 
It should be clarified in advance, however, that identities, subject positions and 
subjects are terms used interchangeably throughout the paper, and while each of 
the terms accentuate different aspects of the same process (of becoming a 
subject), all rest on the same assumption: that it is produced (negotiated), that it 
is social (relational), and that it is performative (a doing and saying rather than 
an inherent feature of a person’s demographic characteristics).  
 
On becoming a subject and processes of subjectivation 
The purpose of this section is to elaborate on the understanding of the processes 
of subjectivation that is applied in this study. The elaboration is intended to 
                                       
6 This argument is parallel to the one Butler (1993:7) makes when she argues that: ‘To claim that 
the subject is itself produced in and as a gendered matrix of relations is not to do away with the 
subject, but only to ask after the conditions of its emergence and operation’. The distinction in 
this paper from the position of Butler is thus twofold: 1) I prefer ‘sex’ as the primary classification 
through and by which we become intelligible subjects over Butler’s ‘gender-matrix’, and 2) I 
choose focus upon the reproductive mechanisms over Butler’s focus on ‘the conditions of its 
emergence’. 
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clarify the where and the how of the processes of subjectivation, which will then 
serve as the point of departure for the analyses of the empirical observations. 
 
The agential realist framework proposed by Karen Barad (1996, 1998, 2000, 
2001, 2003) forms the theoretical starting point of the discussion of the process 
of subjectivation. With respect to the processes of becoming a subject, there are 
two central dimensions of the agential realist framework that I wish to elaborate 
upon. First, the agential realist concepts of apparatus and mechanism are 
considered in order to further our understanding of the relation between meaning 
and the construction of the subject. Second, Barad’s proposal of where and when 
the construction of identities takes place is discussed.  
 
Before I enter the discussion of the central dimensions of the agential realist 
framework mentioned above, I wish to draw attention to the theoretical 
foundations and central premises of the agential realist perspective. In the words 
of Barad (2000:86), the premises of the framework can be described as such: 
‘I combine Bohr’s notion of apparatuses as physical-conceptual devices that are 
productive of (and part of) phenomena with Foucault’s post-Althusserian notion of 
apparatuses as technologies of subjectivation through which power acts, and with 
Butler’s theory of gender performativity which links subject formation as an iterative 
and contingent process to the materialization of sexed bodies.’ (Italics added) 
 
In the agential realist perspective, the mechanism of reproduction is illustrated by 
a metaphor of a gear-assemblage. Barad (2001:97) proposes that an apparatus, 
which produces subjects, can be envisioned as such: 
‘The gear assemblage (i.e. a gear assemblage in which the gear operations literally 
work through one another and in which an uneven distribution of forces results in 
and is the enabling condition for different potentials and performances among the 
gears), which in an ongoing fashion is being (re)configured/(re)assembled while it is 
itself in the process of producing other gear assemblages’. 
 
In an agential realist perspective, the process of becoming a subject is described 
as a process of materialization; a process that constructs representations of who 
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we are by constructing boundaries within which subjects become culturally 
intelligible/unintelligible. Barad (1998:108) describes the process as:  
‘(M)aterialization is an iteratively intra-active7 process whereby material-discursive8 
bodies are sedimented out of the intra-action of multiple material-discursive 
apparatuses through which these phenomena (bodies) becomes intelligible.’ 
 
In the context of this study in trying to answer the question of how we become 
subjects, there are several features of the process that needs to be explored: 1) 
the relation between power and the process of becoming, 2) the creation of 
boundaries and the mechanisms of boundary drawings, and 3) the concept of 
cultural intelligibility. These issues will be the topics of the following sections. 
 
Power and the subject 
In the agential realist framework, the distribution of power among the individual 
gears is what enables the process of production to continue. The gears denote 
phenomena, which are produced by and are themselves producing yet other 
phenomena. As such, the framework suggests that particular meanings are 
embedded in other structures of meaning. To Barad, the gear assemblage is a 
boundary drawing mechanism, where the gears are not only producers of 
meaning and exclusionary mechanisms, but also products of previous boundary 
drawing exercises9. Thus, as long as I render feasible that the chains of words 
and deeds are intra-related and continuations of each other, the proposition must 
be accepted that the meanings embedded in each of the elements of these chains 
(which emerge as expressions of the chains and the workings of the gears), are 
simultaneously expressions of the chain and of the workings of the gears. As 
such, the practices of gender are constituted as practices ‘out-there’ (as 
                                       
7 Barad has coined the term ‘intra-action’ to underline that a measuring apparatus cannot be 
separated from the object of study. While this carries a separate epistemological point, this will 
not be elaborated further in this paper. 
8 Barad uses the term ‘material-discursive’ to signify that both discourse and materiality matters, 
and that these dimensions are interrelated and inseparable.  
9 The relation between the agential realist conceptualization of gears, and Bourdieu’s concept of 
social practices will be the topic of the section on social practices immediately following this 
section. 
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possibilities of doing and saying), which hence requires studies of the multitude 
of expressions of locally negotiated practices. 
 
With respect to fundamental propositions of the agential realist framework, it 
should also be emphasized that it draws upon a Foucaultian notion of power. To 
Foucault, the process of becoming is intimately related to the concept of power, 
where power is not merely something that someone has over someone else, but 
part of the very mechanisms by which we are constructed as subjects. Foucault 
(1994:331) clarifies his position by stating that: 
‘This form of power [a technique rather than an institution of power or elite] that 
applies itself to immediate everyday life categorizes the individual, marks him [sic] by 
his own individuality, attaches him to his own identity, imposes a law of truth on him 
that he must recognize and others have to recognize in him. It is a form of power that 
makes individuals subjects’. (Italics added) 
 
Apart from elaborating on the relation between the process of becoming (known to 
oneself and others), Foucault also hints at other central dimensions of the ways 
in which power is productive, which is of central relevance to this study. The 
‘immediate everyday life’ is one such issue, which will be elaborated upon later in 
this paper in relation to the concept of boundaries of cultural intelligibility, as is 
the proposition that power according to Foucault (Ibid.) is imposing a law of truth 
on the individual. 
 
While this indeed does carry consequences for the ways in which power can be 
conceptualized, it also affects the ways in which power can/should be analyzed. 
‘We can say that all types of subjugation are derived phenomena, that they are merely 
the consequences of other economic and social processes: forces of production, class 
struggle and ideological structures that determine the form of subjectivity. It is certain 
that the mechanisms of subjection cannot be studied outside their relation to the 
mechanisms of exploitation and domination. But they do not merely constitute the 
“terminal” of more fundamental mechanisms. They entertain complex and circular 
relations with other forms.’ (Foucault, 1994:332) 
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In the context of the present study, Foucault’s proposition that mechanisms of 
subjection are related not only to power, but also to other ‘complex and circular 
relations with other forms’ indicates that studies of the process of subjectivation 
(or subjugation, which is the term used by Foucault) needs to include other 
mechanisms that relate to the mechanisms of power in complex and circular 
ways. Foucault’s suggestion on how to proceed with studies of ‘becoming’ thus 
includes the proposition to investigate other mechanisms as well as that of power, 
but also to include the relation between the mechanism of power and other 
mechanisms of subjectivation. Moreover, Foucault advises us to view the process 
as continuously affecting our ways of behaving by the means of everyday-life 
activities. 
‘Let us ask…how things work at the level of on-going subjugation, at the level of those 
continuous and uninterrupted processes which subject our bodies, govern our 
gestures, dictate our behaviors, etc. … we should try to discover how it is that 
subjects are gradually, progressively, really and materially constituted through a 
multiplicity of organisms, forces, energies, materials, desires, thoughts, etc. We 
should try to grasp subjugation in its material instance as a constitution of subjects’. 
(Foucault in Butler, 1997:79) 
 
What becomes of utmost importance is consequently to elaborate on how these 
everyday-life activities are structured and structuring, indeed how social 
practices can be related to the construction of subject positions in the current 
study. 
 
Social practices - Boundary drawing mechanisms 
As illustrated above, the process of becoming may be viewed as a process in 
which everyday-life activities affect the constitution of subjects. In the following, 
the concept of social practices as coined by Pierre Bourdieu will be applied in 
order to conceptualize what denotes ‘everyday-life activities’ and how these 
activities are related to the process of becoming a subject. The idea that practices 
play a central role in processes of becoming is mirrored in the works of Barad 
(1998:106), where she argues that:   
‘Bodies are material-discursive phenomena that materialize in intra-action with, and 
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are inseparable from, particular apparatuses of bodily production, that is, practices 
through which they become intelligible’. (Italics added) 
 
The concept of social practices has been a hallmark in the works of Pierre 
Bourdieu. While the application of the concept of social practices in this paper 
deviates from how Bourdieu (1990) applies the concept in relation to habitus, 
there are still a number of common dimensions. As such, the present application 
of social practices is to a large extent developed in relation to (some would say, in 
opposition to) the works of Bourdieu. 
 
One of the central questions with respect to the status of social practices to be 
answered is how the practices are related to the production and reproduction of 
subject positions. However, prior to elaborating upon the use of the concept in 
this study, the perspective of Bourdieu shall be discussed. 
 
In the words of Bourdieu (1990:53) habitus are: 
‘[S]ystems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures, that is, 
principles which generate and organize practices and representations that can be 
objectively adapted to their outcomes without presupposing a conscious aiming at 
ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary to attain them. Objectively 
‘regulated’ and ‘regular’ without being in any way the product of obedience to rules, 
they can be collectively orchestrated without being the product of the organizing 
action of a conductor’. 
 
Thus, the habitus is related to how we act. Human beings act in ways that appear 
to be regulated and resilient, but which are not regulated by any master-
conductor; nobody makes us repeat our actions. Our actions, which follow 
particular structuring principles, are not set on any conscious goal. We act but 
without being (consciously) aware of the consequences that our acts will produce. 
Social practices are what we do, when we act according to the structured 
structures of the habitus. As such, when Bourdieu (1990:55) argues that 
‘(t)hrough the habitus, the structure of which it is a product governs practices, 
not along the paths of mechanical determinism, but within the constraints and 
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limits initially set on its invention’, this lends support to the assumption that 
classificatory principles may be included as ‘the limits initially set’.  
 
According to Bourdieu (1990) our actions are regulated, though not determined, 
by a habitus; it is a set of dispositions, that we have initially acquired in early 
childhood, and which we keep reproducing by repeating our acts. The habitus is 
a scheme based on historical experiences, which will affect our ‘perceptions and 
appreciation of all subsequent experiences’ (Bourdieu, 1990:54). 
 
As such, our habitus makes us act in particular ways; perform particular social 
practices, that other people with whom we share the habitus, are able to 
decipher. Bourdieu (1990: 58) explains that:  
‘In so far – and only in so far – as habitus are the incorporation of the same history, or 
more concretely, of the same history objectified in habitus and structures, the 
practices they generate are mutually intelligible and immediately adjusted to 
the structures, and also objectively concerted and endowed with an objective 
meaning that is at once unitary and systematic, transcending subjective intentions 
and conscious projects, whether individual or collective. One of the fundamental 
effects of the harmony between practical sense and objectified meaning (sens) is the 
production of a common-sense world, whose immediate self-evidence is accompanied 
by the objectivity provided by consensus on the meaning of practices and the 
world, in other words the harmonization of the agents’ experiences and the constant 
reinforcement each of them receives from expression – individual or collective (in 
festivals, for example), improvised or programmed (commonplaces, sayings) – of 
similar or identical experiences.’ (Italics in original, bolds added) 
 
Bourdieu’s ontology rests on the assumption that there is a social world in which 
people of similar habitus agree on the meanings of the world and of practices, 
respectively, and where the meanings embedded in the social practices are 
consequently reproduced without any conscious effort on the part of the agent. 
As such, what we do, the social practices that we reproduce, carries particular 
meanings about the world that appear self-evident to the people with whom we 
share a history.  
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The last dimension of the habitus to which I want to draw attention is how the 
habitus is related to the process of subjectivation. Bourdieu’s concept of habitus 
includes directions on how we become recognized as members of a particular 
habitus, i.e. how we become subjects in the eyes of the world. In Bourdieu’s 
perspective, social practices draw boundaries between what is suitable and what 
is not suitable for “people like us”. The social practices construct a room of action 
for the subject by excluding all the acts that would be perceived as unsuitable 
and hence be negatively judged by the group with whom the habitus is shared.10 
 
Bourdieu (1990:55-56) argues that: 
’[B]eing the product of a particular class of objective regularities, the habitus tends to 
generate all the ‘reasonable’, ‘common-sense’, behaviours (and only these) which are 
possible within the limits of these regularities, and which are likely to be positively 
sanctioned because they are objectively adjusted to the logic characteristics of a 
particular field, whose objective future they anticipate. At the same time, ‘without 
violence, art or argument’11, it tends to exclude all ‘extravagances’ (‘not for the likes of 
us’), that is, all the behaviours that would be negatively sanctioned because they are 
incompatible with the objective conditions’. 
 
As such, we are granted an individual identity, or subject position, in relation to 
an already established collective identity by conforming to the rules of a 
particular habitus, and by reproducing social practices, which we know will be 
judged favorably by our fellows.  
 
                                       
10 There is a parallel between Foucault’s idea of disciplinary power and the idea proposed here by 
Bourdieu, that people act according to the expected consequences in terms of social recognition. 
11 Bourdieu’s argument that the conformity to social norms occurs without ‘without violence, art or 
argument’ stands in stark contrast to the concepts of discipline and power in a Foucaultian 
universe (which is also the universe that Butler inhabits). While Bourdieu may be right to say that 
there is no apparent physical violence or public arguments leading to the construction of social 
practices, this does not rule out the possibility that the social practices are the result of 
negotiations between actants in different positions. The argument in this piece of research is that 
the fact that negotiations even take place indicate that the relative power of the different actants 
in the negotiation process will play a part, which at least reflects that some sort of ‘argument’ is 
taking place, or even that ‘violence’ is done. This argument finds support in Bourdieu’s own idea 
that the practices are regulated by whether or not they are “positively sanctioned”, which 
indicates that punishment is intimately related to the reproduction of the practices. 
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To Bourdieu, the concepts of doxa and hexis are central to our understanding of 
the habitus, where doxa denotes the ‘relationship of immediate adherence that is 
established in practice between a habitus and the field to which it is attuned, the 
pre-verbal taking-for-granted of the world that flows from practical sense’ 
(Bourdieu, 1990:68), while bodily hexis denotes an embodied realization of a 
political mythology, such as a mythology based on the classification male/female 
that Bourdieu uses as a way to illustrate the point12. Bourdieu (1990:69-70) 
explains that:  
‘Bodily hexis is political mythology realized, em-bodied, turned into a permanent 
disposition, a durable way of standing, speaking, walking, and thereby of feeling and 
thinking’. 
 
Both the concepts of doxa and bodily hexis are related to Bourdieu’s 
understanding of ‘practical sense’. Bourdieu argues that (1990: 69):  
‘Practical sense, social necessity turned into nature, converted into motor schemes 
and body automatisms, is what causes practices, in and through what makes them 
obscure to the eyes of their producers, to be sensible, that is, informed by a common 
sense. It is because agents never know completely what they are doing that what they 
do has more sense than they know’. 
 
In my reading of Bourdieu (1977, 1990), this means that doxa refers to the 
embodied tacit beliefs of a particular field, whereas the hexis refers to the ways in 
which the doxa is performed. These concepts become central to this study exactly 
because Bourdieu relates the ‘entering in to a field’ and ‘becoming legitimate’ to 
these notions, which parallels the argument of this study that social practices 
produce particular boundaries of cultural intelligibility. Bourdieu (1990:68) 
explains: 
                                       
12 Bourdieu (1990:70) provides an illustration of the embodiment of hexis, by stating that: ‘The 
opposition between male and female is realized in posture, in the gestures and movements of the 
body, in the form of oppositions between the straight and the bent, between firmness, uprightness  
and directness (a man faces forward, looking and striking directly at his adversary), and restraint, 
reserve and flexibility’. Bourdieu’s illustrative example lends further support to the proposition of 
this paper of studying the ways in which gender is performed by investigating the classifications 
that enforce/restrain the mechanisms of subjectivation, since I take it that Bourdieu did not think 
of e.g. “bent” or “restrained” as natural dispositions of all females, but rather a way in which 
gender was performed in the social setting of Kabyle. 
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‘Practical faith is the condition of entry that every field tacitly imposes, not only by 
sanctioning and debarring those who would destroy the game, but by so arranging 
things, in practice, that the operations of selecting and shaping new entrants (rites of 
passage, examinations, etc.) are such as to obtain from them that undisputed, pre-
reflexive, naive, native compliance with the fundamental presuppositions of the field 
which is the very definition of doxa’. 
 
As such, the concept of social practices is taken to be the gears of the “gear-
assemblage” metaphor of Karen Barad mentioned above. Social practices are thus 
embedded in the mechanism of materialization by which bodies are sedimented 
out of a multitude of material-discursive apparatuses through which these bodies 
becomes intelligible. 
 
The following section will be devoted to discussions of exactly the construction of 
boundaries of cultural intelligibility, however, I shall first discuss how the 
position of this study is related to the propositions of Bourdieu. 
 
There are a number of dimensions of the ways in which Bourdieu conceptualizes 
the habitus, which corresponds with the analytical framework of this study; the 
concept of habitus does provide some of the answers needed to relate social 
practices to the construction of identities and boundaries of intelligibility. 
However, the habitus also gives rise to other questions, and points to areas where 
the framework needs to be further developed.  
 
The view of the social world in this paper builds upon the same idea of a 
structured, but non-deterministic social world that is present in Bourdieu’s 
concept of habitus. Moreover, Bourdieu’s idea of a (non-mechanistic) mechanism, 
which serves to reproduce particular patterns of social practices also corresponds 
very well with how the concept of social practices is used in this study.  
 
Nevertheless, there are central questions in relation to this study that demands 
further attention. First, there is the question of whether social practices can be 
found in ‘acts’ only, or if e.g. ‘things’ are able to carry meanings and reproduce 
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social practices as well. And second, there are two interrelated questions, namely 
that of whether early experiences have a disproportionately strong effect upon all 
social practices, and therefore if the relation between e.g. the habitus of the social 
class into which you are born is “strong” enough to counter potential changes 
caused by later experiences and changes in social class. With respect to the first 
of the questions, the position of this paper is that not only “saying and doing” 
count as social practices, but that ‘things’ indeed also are structuring structures, 
which draw boundaries of intelligibility.13 “Things” are social practices; 
structuring structures. Following the argument of Barad (1998), materiality 
cannot, and should not, be conceived as matters separate from one another.  
 
With respect to whether early experiences have a disproportional effect, the 
position of this paper is that “becoming” (a member) in new (e.g. organizational) 
settings is at least equally effective with respect to creating a habitus as are early 
childhood experiences.14 Consequently, the organizational setting is viewed as a 
setting in which new ways of being are negotiated; the organizational history and 
context which provides the negotiations its situatedness, which builds upon the 
argument of West & Zimmerman (1987:126) that: ‘it is individuals who “do” 
gender. But it is a situated doing, carried out in virtual or real presence of others 
who are presumed to be oriented to its production’. This means that the 
organization is taken to be the where and when of the process of subjectivation 
investigated in this study. This perspective is supported by Barad (2000:79), who 
propose that:  
‘(T)he shop floor [can] be understood in agential realist terms as a “material-discursive 
apparatus of bodily production” – an instrument of power through which particular 
meanings and bodies and material-discursive boundaries are produced’.  
 
                                       
13 The office layout and interior decoration is an example of “things” which carries meanings and 
construct boundaries of intelligibility. The fact that the number of chairs and desks are equal, and 
that the chairs are positioned behind the desks may be viewed as a way in which the boundaries 
of intelligibility with respect to legitimate ‘bodily positions’ while working is conveyed. Lying on the 
floor under the desk, or on top of the desk would be crossing the boundary of intelligibility of how 
work is carried out. 
14 It may even be argued that it would make sense to perceive newly hired employees as the 
‘infants’ of a particular work place.  
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Thereby Barad paths the way for analyses of becoming, which takes it point of 
departure in real-time practices at an organizational level. Thus, even if the 
central social practices are created by early childhood experiences, later and 
highly localized negotiations may be relevant and provide new insights as to how 
the process of becoming is related to social practices and the ways in which 
boundaries of what denotes socially intelligible identities are constructed. 
 
Boundaries of cultural intelligibility 
As mentioned above, the concept of ‘social practices’ is in this study taken to 
denote mechanisms that involve the drawing of boundaries. Butler (1993) follows 
a similar argument in her perspective on how identities are formed, as do 
Foucault (1994:331) when he argues that there is a “law of truth” imposed on the 
subject, that ‘he [sic] must recognize and others have to recognize in him’, and 
that this is a form of power that makes individuals subjects.  
 
Butler’s starting point differs from that of Foucault in that Butler claims that 
identities are based on sex, gender, sexual practices and desires. As such, the 
subject, and thus what I refer to as subject positions, is ‘produced in and as a 
gendered matrix of relations’ (Butler, 1990:7), where the practices and even the 
matrix itself is reproducing particular understandings of the subject, sex, and 
gender as well as the heterosexual hegemony.  
 
Butler (1993:2) argues that: ‘”Sex” is, thus, not simply what one has, or a static 
description of what one is: it will be one of the norms by which the “one” becomes 
viable at all, that which qualifies a body for life within the domain of cultural 
intelligibility’. However, Butler notes that while “sex” is a central dimension of 
qualifying as a culturally intelligible subject, other social categories are in fact 
related to and intertwined with the category of sex. Hence, despite the fact that 
subjects, according to Butler, become just that: subjects, by performing according 
to a gendered matrix, other social characteristics (e.g. race and class) are being 
performed as well. Who we are, is in essence, who we appear to be in the eyes of 
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other people. To become a subject is social, in the sense that it is a matter of 
performing an identity (male, white, manager, high income) that are culturally 
intelligible within the particular social setting in which we act. 
 
As such, identity is performative, given that what we do is in fact constructing 
who and what we appear to be. Butler (1990:33) explains this by making a 
reference to the construction of gender identity: 
‘In this sense, gender is not a noun, but neither is it a set of free-floating attributes, 
for we have seen that the substantive effect of gender is performatively produced and 
compelled by the regulatory practices of gender coherence. Hence, within the 
inherited discourse of the metaphysics of substance, gender proves to be performative 
– that is constituting the identity that it is purported to be. In this sense, gender is 
always a doing, though not a doing by a subject who might be said to preexist the 
deed. (…) There is no gender identity behind the expression of gender; that identity is 
performatively constituted by the very “expressions” that are said to be its results’.  
 
Our acts, and indeed the repeated acts, which I term social practices, thus 
constitute who we are. We become subjects within the domain of social/cultural 
intelligibility. As long as we act within the boundaries of cultural intelligibility, 
our acts will allow us to become subjects in the eyes of others as well as 
ourselves. Our acts will merely have to be performed in accordance with the 
particular social categories that we (want to?) represent. What we appear to be to 
others, e.g. a woman, is thus the result of our own conforming to the cultural 
rules of “what makes a woman”. As such, ‘the naming is at once the setting of a 
boundary, and also the repeated inculcation of a norm’ (Butler, 1993:8).  
 
By naming and acting according to a constructed boundary we reproduce the 
meanings (embedded in the norms) that are built into the norms historically 
through the use of these exact names. Thus, while acting according to a matrix, 
we are also reproducing a domain of cultural unintelligibility, which excludes 
particular acts, identities and consequently, human beings from becoming 
‘subjects’; from assuming a subject position. Butler (1993:3) argues that: 
‘The exclusionary matrix by which subjects are formed thus requires the 
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simultaneous production of a domain of abject beings, those who are not yet 
“subjects,” but who form the constitutive outside to the domain of subjects. The abject 
designates here precisely those “unlivable” and “uninhabitable” zones of social life 
which are nevertheless densely populated by those who do not enjoy the status of the 
subject, but whose living under the sign of the “unlivable” is required to circumscribe 
the domain of the subject’.  
 
In the perspective of Butler, the process of becoming a subject thus involves the 
drawing of boundaries and making exclusions. In a particular social setting, there 
are acts and identities that are “uninhabitable”, or even unthinkable, while others 
appear natural, in that they comply with our common understanding of what is 
right to do or to be. However, the construction of the boundaries of cultural 
intelligibility is by no means arbitrary or natural.  
 
In Butler’s perspective, building on a Foucaultian notion of power, the 
construction of boundaries of intelligibility is related to the productive element of 
power. Butler (1997:132) clarifies her position by arguing that:  
‘This notion of a productive or formative power is not reducible to the tutelary 
function of the state, that is, the moral instructions of its citizens, but operates to 
make certain kinds of citizens possible and others impossible’. 
 
As such, power and the construction of boundaries of intelligibility are intimately 
related. While this proposition is indeed a convincing ontology, in my perspective 
this also provides the opportunity to discuss how power is intertwined with the 
construction of the classifications and classificatory principles to which the 
boundaries of intelligibility adhere. Prior to moving to the discussions of 
classifications and classificatory principles, however, I shall discuss how I view 
the similarities and differences of the works of Butler and Bourdieu, respectively 
to enable a clarification of the position of this study in relation to the two authors. 
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Despite the fact that Butler’s starting point and purpose differs radically from 
those of Bourdieu, there are numerous common denominators between Butler’s 
concept of performative identity and Bourdieu’s habitus.15  
 
One of the main difference that I wish to elaborate upon is that whereas Bourdieu 
keeps his focus upon the field of sociological theories, Butler (1990) takes 
psychoanalytical theories (e.g. Freud and Lacan), as well as French feminism and 
post-structuralism (e.g. Irigaray, Kristeva and Wittig) as her point of departure. 
Butler (1990) develops what could be termed “an identity theory” based on the 
concept of ‘performance’, which takes sex, gender, sexual practice and desire as 
fundamental elements.  
 
Butler’s performativity and Bourdieu’s habitus share the idea that social 
practices are repetitive and that meaning is embedded in the practices, in the 
sense that locally negotiated practices are assigned meaning in the particular 
social/cultural setting in which they occur, and that human beings imitate 
(Bourdieu) or cite (Butler) previous acts. 
 
Butler (1999:241) argues that: ‘Performativity is not a singular ‘act’ for it is 
always a reiteration of a norm or a set of norms, and to the extent that it acquires 
an act-like status in the present, it conceals or dissimulates the conventions of 
which it is a repetition’. Thus, not only are social practices repetitive, the 
repetitions of the practices hide the meanings embedded in the norms upon 
which they are based. Butler makes use of the Derridean notion of iterability, to 
qualify the above statement, and continues to say that ‘every act is itself a 
recitation, the citing of a prior chain of acts which are implied in a present act 
and which perpetually drain any ‘present’ act of its presentness’ (Butler, 
                                       
15 Butler has herself related her position to that of Bourdieu, but confesses that she did not realize 
the alliance between her own concept of ”ritual” to that of Bourdieu’s ”habitus” until after she had 
written the original text (Butler, 1999:192/Endnote 8). 
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1999:244). Thus, in our reproduction of norms – which are based on past norms 
– we reconfirm meanings that remain invisible to, or even hidden from, us.  
 
But how are decisions made with regard to which of the past norms that are 
reproduced, and which are abandoned? As opposed to Bourdieu, Butler’s 
ontology does not rest upon a view of the world as ‘conductor-less’, even if the 
conductor in Butler’s case does not take the shape of a person, or is easily 
identifiable. According to Butler, power is present in our every action. Butler 
builds upon the works of Foucault by stating that ‘sex’ is a ‘regulatory ideal’, and 
explains that sex ‘not only functions as a norm, but is part of a regulatory 
practice that produces the bodies it governs, that is, whose regulatory force is 
made clear as a kind of productive power, the power to produce – demarcate, 
circulate, differentiate – the bodies that it controls’ (Butler, 1999:235). Thus, 
according to Butler, we repeat the actions that the regulatory ideal proposes, and 
thereby we become a product of the norms upon which the ideal is based. Thus, 
there is a difference between the perspective of Bourdieu and Butler with respect 
to how power is intertwined with the reproduction of social practices, where this 
dissertation builds upon Butler’s rather than Bourdieu’s perspective. (See note 9 
above for the difference between Butler’s and Bourdieu’s perspectives, 
respectively, on power and social practices).  
 
Butler positions her concept of performativity in relation to the meaning of the 
concept in speech act theory. In Butler’s perspective, performativity is ‘the 
reiterative and citational practice by which discourse produces the effects that it 
names’ (Butler, 1999:236). Thus, Butler’s performativity is similar to that of 
speech act theory in that it is based on the idea that a discursive practice 
produces what it names, but different in the sense that while speech act theory 
relies on the power or will of a subject, Butler finds power to be a derivative.  
 
In the perspective of Butler (1999), power is derived from the extent to which a 
norm is ‘cited’ or performed. How we describe things, which names they are 
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given, are not innocent activities that simply mirror the ‘natural world’. On the 
contrary Butler (1999:240-241) argues that:  
‘[a] delimitation, which often is enacted as an untheorized presupposition in any act of 
description, marks a boundary that includes and excludes, that decides, as it were, 
what will and will not be the stuff of the object to which we then refer. This marking 
off will have some normative force and, indeed some violence, for it can construct only 
through erasing; it can bound a thing only through enforcing a certain criterion, a 
principle of selectivity’. 
 
The dimensions of the world to which we focus our attention and the practices 
that we reproduce are thus not accidental, but affected by a normative force. 
Social practices are not innocent activities. The boundaries that we reproduce 
through repeating some and not other social practices, carry implications and 
have consequences for the classifications that we perceive “natural”, the 
meanings that are (re)produced and, perhaps most importantly, for the subject 
positions that are rendered possible.  
 
Conclusion: To study the practices of gender in organizations 
The purpose of this paper was to present a way in which to further our 
understanding of the mechanisms by which sex segregation at an organizational 
level is reproduced. 
 
The proposition of the paper is that identities are always already gendered given 
that the main classificatory principle in the world of human beings is based on 
sex. The paper argues that accepting that sex is but a classificatory principle, and 
indeed one of a multitude of other ways in which classifications could be made, 
carries consequences for how studies of gender can be performed in general, and 
in organizations in particular. In this perspective, it becomes meaningless to 
study inherent essential characteristics, values, interests or behavioral patterns 
of the one or the other side of the dichotomy. Instead, the focus is directed upon 
the ways in which the classification is enforced/restrained through the relation 
between this and other classifications. While sex may serve as the overarching 
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classification by which we are made subjects, gender is what we perform by 
adhering to the sum of local classificatory schemes and social practices. 
 
The ontological starting point that takes sex as the main classificatory principle 
thus excludes research that aim at revealing ‘gendering practices’, and instead 
focuses the attention to ‘practices of gender’ (Yancey Martin, 2003). It becomes 
impossible to study gendering practices, since that would involve an a priori 
knowledge of what gender is, what is inherently feminine/masculine, and what 
counts as gender discrimination. Instead, I propose a path to understanding the 
ways in which sex segregation is continuously reproduced by focusing on how 
gender is performed, in accordance with locally produced organizational 
classificatory schemes in which sex is intertwined as the classificatory principle 
  
Hence, in this paper, I suggest that new dimensions of the practices of gender in 
organizations can be made visible by studying the process of subjectivation, the 
mechanisms by which we become subjects. In order to conceptualize the ways in 
which these mechanisms work, the paper introduces the concepts of power, 
social practices, boundaries of intelligibility and classifications, and provides 
illustrations of how these dimensions of the mechanism can be viewed as 
separate “gears” of a “gear-assemblage”, which produces intelligible and 
unintelligible subjects. The paper stops short of an elaborated epistemological 
discussion, but does provide a starting point from which new knowledge of how 
the practices of an organization are able to produce particular subject positions 
while rendering other impossible can be gathered. 
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